102 Dems & 12 Repubs vote NO on Afghan War
102 Dems & 12 Repubs vote NO on Afghan War
washingtonpost.com
102 Dems & 12 Repubs vote NO on Afghan War
washingtonpost.com
Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?
- Thread starter ugabuga
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The whole war in the Middle East has become a broken record. Has this war lasted longer than Vietnam yet? There are terrorists and bad people all over the world. We can't continue to spend billions chasing them all down. Terrorists are like weeds, you can continue to eradicate them from your backyard but more will just pop up. I think the best we can do is spend money on protecting our borders and increasing our security within our country so terrorists will never be able to attack us on our own land ever again. I think that's a more realistic goal. With all that money we've spent over there, we could have increased our border security, improved our education system, improved our health care system and perhaps have prevented the housing market crash ad recession.
I spoke with one of my colleagues who has had two daughters over there and currently has one son-in-law in Iraq and another son-in-law in Afghanistan. He said that they have a positive attitude and just do the best job they can possibly do. But they all agree that we need to get out of both countries.
As Bella Vega said, that money could be better spent.
As Bella Vega said, that money could be better spent.
Newsweek just did an article about how we could have "won" in Iraq and Afghanistan if we managed to provide them with electricity. We have spend hundreds of millions of US tax dollars on power plant projects and most Iraqis still only have power 6 hours a day.
Not to mention that the projects are massive cash cows for defense contractors - one power plant we paid $305 million for should have cost $130 million. Look no further for how to cut the deficit!
Not Enough Electricity in Afghanistan and Iraq - Newsweek
Electricity is not a religion, of course, but it?s a world changer. You want to transform the culture of the Afghan hinterland? Let little girls there watch TV. You want to keep the bad guys off the streets in Baghdad? It helps if their air conditioners work, so they want to stay in the cool of their homes. Winning hearts and minds in the modern world is not about generating gratitude; it?s about getting people on the grid, even and especially when there is no grid, so they have the desire to change their lives and the ability to follow through.
That the United States has been unable to deliver this basic utility is a failure with truly far-reaching consequences?an early and enduring proof of superpower impotence. The expectations of the people in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, whatever other misgivings they may have had about the U.S.-led invasions of their countries, were that the Americans could at least get basic infrastructure up and running in short order. The United States had the technology, the know-how, the money. And in both countries there were huge needs.
Washington never quite realized, or at least never firmly decided, that turning on the lights should be at the top of its list. And when the great military-industrial contracting machine did focus attention, in short spurts, it tended to throw money away on private security contractors and wildly expensive air transport of heavy machinery and even trailers to house personnel. According to Hinks, the whole process got bogged down in a system of overpriced contracts with the U.S. government that generated huge amounts of money for the biggest contractors but relatively little electricity. These virtually open-ended ?cost-plus? deals allow the contractors who get them to keep billing as costs rise, and to take a commission on what?s paid, so the more they spend, the more they pocket. Poor performance is rewarded at government expense. ?If the contractor makes mistakes, it does not lose anything as a consequence,? said Hinks.?It is like giving your children whatever money they ask for. A cost-plus contractor will lose any appreciation for the value of money.?
In room 106 of the Dirksen building, Hinks told the commission?which is only too well aware of this pervasive approach to government contracting in war zones?that he thinks most deals should have firm fixed prices, which are the type he normally gets. At the same time, he said, too little effort has been made to bring Iraqis and Afghans into the process of building, protecting, and running power networks. Security contractors are often hired as part of the cost-plus process, and they keep running up expenses to protect workers, equipment, and themselves against the locals. Hinks turned that process on its head in Iraq in order to get the job done. ?In many cases we worked with tribal leaders who managed the work in their areas of influence,? he said. ?In some of the most volatile areas of the country, the local sheiks became Symbion?s partners.? People who worked on the project told me last year that Hinks had the towers built in Fallujah by a man well connected with local tribal leaders. Each agreed to support the erection of towers in his territory, getting paid for water, sand, and other construction materials. Their people got jobs, too. At the height of the project, 2,700 were employed. The lines got built, and they stayed up.
Not to mention that the projects are massive cash cows for defense contractors - one power plant we paid $305 million for should have cost $130 million. Look no further for how to cut the deficit!
Not Enough Electricity in Afghanistan and Iraq - Newsweek
Electricity is not a religion, of course, but it?s a world changer. You want to transform the culture of the Afghan hinterland? Let little girls there watch TV. You want to keep the bad guys off the streets in Baghdad? It helps if their air conditioners work, so they want to stay in the cool of their homes. Winning hearts and minds in the modern world is not about generating gratitude; it?s about getting people on the grid, even and especially when there is no grid, so they have the desire to change their lives and the ability to follow through.
That the United States has been unable to deliver this basic utility is a failure with truly far-reaching consequences?an early and enduring proof of superpower impotence. The expectations of the people in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, whatever other misgivings they may have had about the U.S.-led invasions of their countries, were that the Americans could at least get basic infrastructure up and running in short order. The United States had the technology, the know-how, the money. And in both countries there were huge needs.
Washington never quite realized, or at least never firmly decided, that turning on the lights should be at the top of its list. And when the great military-industrial contracting machine did focus attention, in short spurts, it tended to throw money away on private security contractors and wildly expensive air transport of heavy machinery and even trailers to house personnel. According to Hinks, the whole process got bogged down in a system of overpriced contracts with the U.S. government that generated huge amounts of money for the biggest contractors but relatively little electricity. These virtually open-ended ?cost-plus? deals allow the contractors who get them to keep billing as costs rise, and to take a commission on what?s paid, so the more they spend, the more they pocket. Poor performance is rewarded at government expense. ?If the contractor makes mistakes, it does not lose anything as a consequence,? said Hinks.?It is like giving your children whatever money they ask for. A cost-plus contractor will lose any appreciation for the value of money.?
In room 106 of the Dirksen building, Hinks told the commission?which is only too well aware of this pervasive approach to government contracting in war zones?that he thinks most deals should have firm fixed prices, which are the type he normally gets. At the same time, he said, too little effort has been made to bring Iraqis and Afghans into the process of building, protecting, and running power networks. Security contractors are often hired as part of the cost-plus process, and they keep running up expenses to protect workers, equipment, and themselves against the locals. Hinks turned that process on its head in Iraq in order to get the job done. ?In many cases we worked with tribal leaders who managed the work in their areas of influence,? he said. ?In some of the most volatile areas of the country, the local sheiks became Symbion?s partners.? People who worked on the project told me last year that Hinks had the towers built in Fallujah by a man well connected with local tribal leaders. Each agreed to support the erection of towers in his territory, getting paid for water, sand, and other construction materials. Their people got jobs, too. At the height of the project, 2,700 were employed. The lines got built, and they stayed up.
66 US deaths in Afghan war in July (for what?)
66 US deaths in Afghan war in July (for what?)
The deaths of at least 66 soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen have made July the deadliest-ever month for American troops in the nine-year war in Afghanistan. The tally includes six American service members who died in four separate attacks in southern Afghanistan on Thursday and Friday.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/world/asia/31afghan.html?_r=1
66 US deaths in Afghan war in July (for what?)
The deaths of at least 66 soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen have made July the deadliest-ever month for American troops in the nine-year war in Afghanistan. The tally includes six American service members who died in four separate attacks in southern Afghanistan on Thursday and Friday.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/world/asia/31afghan.html?_r=1