Does freedom of speech only apply to those with whom we agree?

whether the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment trumps its freedom of religion and peaceful assembly; and whether an individual attending a family member?s funeral constitutes a ?captive audience? who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication.

In respect for the deceased and their mourners, American courts have repeatedly described a?right? to a peaceful funeral. ?There is a right to a decent burial, and that right is guarded by the law.?22A Am. Jur. 2d Dead Bodies ? 13. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained: ?We can imagine no clearer or dearer right in the gamut of civil liberty and security than to bury our dead in peace and unobstructed; none more sacred to the individual, nor more important of preservation and protection from the point of view of public welfare and decency; certainly none where the law need less hesitate to impose upon a willful violator responsibility for the uttermost consequences of his act.? Koerber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40, 43 (Wis. 1905); see also Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654, 656 (N.H. 1964)

First and foremost, this case is about speech, not conduct. The theory of Petitioner?s case was that his injury flowed directly from the content of Respondents? speech. Had Respondents attended the Snyder memorial service without their signs, or instead displayed signs expressing sympathy (such as those held by the St. John?s school children), there would have been no verdict against Respondents. The jury found against Respondents because of what they said, not because of their presence at Matthew Snyder?s funeral.
Second, this case is not about the constitutionality of statutes regulating the time, place, and manner of funeral protests, and the arguments of various amici predicting that affirmance here will invalidate such
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laws are incorrect. No ?funeral statute? is involved in this case. Respondents displayed their signs at a location chosen for them by local law enforcement, not one they chose themselves. And that location?1000 feet from the church entrance?was 10 times farther removed from the church than Maryland?s later-enacted funeral statute would permit.
Because this is a pure speech case, the Court of Appeals ruled correctly. The common law torts of ?intentional infliction of emotional distress? and ?intrusion upon seclusion? are intended to protect individuals from unwanted and injurious conduct that is directed towards them. Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that the substance of speech caused emotional injury, these torts are designed to protect the listener from hearing speech that he prefers not to encounter, and to impose liability on the speaker for having spoken. That is why the district court instructed the jury to return a verdict for Petitioner on the ?intrusion? claim if the jurors found Respondents? speech to be ?highly offensive to a reasonable person.? It is also why it instructed the jurors to return a verdict for Petitioner on the ?emotional distress? claim if they found that Respondents? speech was ?extreme and outrageous.?
However, the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion are designed to protect the right of speakers to voice their views on matters of public concern and to express their religious convictions.